APRIL-MAY 2002
(SUMMARY)
VIII.1. THE INFORMAL SECTOR
The informal seed sector in Afghanistan is individual-farmer and community-based seed production, which supply most of the seed of the country. The informal seed sector includes farmer seed production under contract with NGOs, FAO, ICARDA, and ICRC to produce seed for delivery to these agencies. It also includes food-for-seed swaps that WFP undertakes in Afghanistan. Fitzherbert describes the informal seed sector as "really nothing more than farmers selling, trading, or giving seed to other farmers; farmer-to-farmer seed exchange has traditionally been robust but never moves much out of one set of valleys or one set of clans." These farmers are not trained in the technology of pure seed production; their seed is often not pure enough to carry benefits of a high-yielding variety or of high germination, purity, freedom from diseases and pests, and/or seed treatment.
VIII.3. AMOUNT OF SEED FROM THE INFORMAL SECTOR
The FAO-supported wheat seed system is an emergency intervention program, but uses as much as possible of the improved seed technologies, and has referred to itself as the "formal seed sector". It has provided a small percentage of the needs for wheat seed, reportedly only about 8% after production was doubled over that of the previous years All "formal sector seed" does not exceed 10% of the wheat seed used, if this much.
VIII.4. SOURCES OF STOCK SEED
"Stock seed" is planted to produce a crop which itself produces seed. Most informal-sector Afghan wheat seed is grown from whatever seed is available to the farmer who produces it.
VIII.5. ORGANIZATION AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
During the period of conflict there has been no organized approach to informal-sector seed supply. No government agency provides technical assistance and/or guidance to farmers in improving their informal seed supply and seed quality. Several NGO's have operated informal-sector seed programs which improved seed quality. These provide a model for organized technical assistance and guidance, and for increasing seed supplied by the informal sector.
VIII.6. THE PRESENT-DAY INFORMAL SEED SECTOR
A 1990 report on seeds by the Swedish Committee on Afghanistan noted that in 1975 the Afghan Seed Company produced 2,500 MT or about 0.7% of wheat seed sown annually; 99.3% of the country's wheat seed was from the informal seed sector. This report also took a dim view of land race varieties being maintained in the informal seed sector: "Wheat varieties until the mid-1960s mostly consisted of non-descript mixtures of old land races susceptible to diseases and lodging. Many varieties had become so contaminated with other varieties that their identity had usually been lost. Most of these varieties did not respond well to commercial fertilizers. In fact, some responded negatively (SCA, 1990, p. 15).
The report was also disappointed with performance of the formal sector during and immediately after the Russian occupation. It noted that the number of Afghan farmers growing irrigated wheat improved varieties had fallen from 43% in 1978 to 31% in 1988.
VIII.11.7. FARM SIZE
More well-to-do farmers seek to produce the highest economic yields, while poorer farmers seek to "produce at the lowest input cost". In a small sampling in Logar and Kabul, there appeared to be no correlation between size of farm and number of varieties used.
Steps should be taken to minimize a tendency to "seed management passivity" by accompanying seed distribution with (appropriately field-tested) instructions on how to manage seed plots and select, store, rotate and exchange seed varieties, and provide feedback to Extension, NGOs, and others on varieties to which farmers are exposed. A practical means of achieving this is described in the "Village Seed Enterprise" included in the Strategies and Recommendations section of this report.
While controlling
factors may be the lack of variety development, seed supply, and Extension
promotion during the extended conflict, it is clear that farmer financial
condition was quite important.